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Abstract
We provide a mechanism that uses two biased coins and imple-
ments any distribution on a finite set of elements, in such a way that
even if the outcomes of one of the coins is determined by an adver-
sary, the final distribution remains unchanged. We apply this result
to show that every quitting game in which at least two players have
at least two continue actions has an undiscounted ε-equilibrium, for
every ε > 0.
Keywords: Jointly controlled lotteries, biased coin, quitting games, equi-
librium.
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1 Introduction
Random numbers are fundamentals for almost all secure computer systems.
However, random number generators are prone to attacks by adversaries,
who may attempt to control their outputs. To hamper an attacker, one can
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use several random number generators, and devise a mechanism that uses
the outcomes of all generators to produce one random outcome, in such a
way that if an attacker controls the outcomes of one (or more, but not all) of
the random number generators, the distribution of the mechanism’s outcome
does not change. For example, if each random number generator chooses
a bit according to the uniform distribution, and the goal is to produce a
random bit whose distribution is uniform, then a plausible mechanism is to
output the xor of all input bits.
In this paper we study this problem, when the distribution according to
which each random generator device chooses its output is not the uniform
distribution. More formally, we are given k random generator devices; in
every instance device i chooses a letter from a finite alphabet Ai according
to the probability distribution Pi, independent of past choices. A mechanism
is given by a stopping time τ and a deterministic rule f that dictates which
letter in some finite alphabet J is selected based on the letters that were
selected by the random generator devices up to time τ . Given a probability
distribution ν over J , the goal is to device a mechanism that is immune to
attacks by an adversary: even if k − 1 of the random number generators
become faulty and produce letters according to some law, the distribution of
the outcome of the mechanism is still ν.
We will provide two mechanisms for selecting an element of J , both of
which depend on a parameter ε > 0. One mechanism has a bounded length
and selects an element in J with a distribution ε-close to ν: as long as at least
one device is not faulty, the probability that each element j ∈ J is selected
is ε-close to ν(j). The second mechanism may be unbounded yet it is finite
a.s. and selects each element j ∈ J with probability exactly ν(j). Moreover,
as long as exactly one device is faulty, the probability that each element j ∈ J
is selected cannot exceed ν(j), and, in case the mechanism never terminates,
the identity of the faulty devices is revealed by the information that reached
the mainframe.
To demonstrate the usefulness of the result, we apply it to study undis-
counted equilibria in stochastic games. Whether every multiplayer stochastic
game admits an undiscounted ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0 is one of the
main open problems in game theory to date; see Flesch, Thuijsman, and
Vrieze (1997), Solan (1999), Vieille (2000a,b), Solan and Vieille (2001), Si-
mon (2012), and Solan and Solan (2017) for partial results. The class of
games that we study in this paper is the class of general quitting games.
Those are quitting games in which each player has a single quitting action
2
and may have several continue actions. This class of games was studied by
Solan and Solan (2018), who showed that those games admit a sunspot ε-
equilibrium for every ε > 0; that is, an ε-equilibrium in an extended game
in which at every stage the players observe the outcome of a uniformly dis-
tributed random variable on [0, 1], which is independent of past signals and
past play. Using jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins we will show
that if at least two players have at least to continue actions, an undiscounted
ε-equilibrium exists.
To date it is not known whether quitting games in which each player
has a single quitting action and a single continue action admit undiscounted
ε-equilibria. Our result shows that when players have enough flexibility in
coordinating their play, an undiscounted ε-equilibrium exists.
There are various ways in which one can strive to extend this equilibrium
existence result.
• Our method shows that jointly controlled lotteries enable one to trans-
form sunspot ε-equilibria into undiscounted ε-equilibria, in various set-
tings of stochastic games. Can one extend the existence result to other
classes of stochastic games that include more than one nonabsorbing
state?
• One property of the class of general quitting games is that some play-
ers have two actions that induce the same transitions, for every given
action profile of the other players. Is it true that an undiscounted ε-
equilibrium exists in any stochastic game in which for every state s,
every player i and every action ai of player i, there is an action a
′
i 6= ai
that yields the same transition as ai at state s?
Biased coins are not prevalent in game theory, since usually it is assumed
that players have all randomization means that they need. One exception is
Gossner and Vieille (2002), who studied two-player zero-sum repeated games
in which the randomization device of one of the players is a biased coin that
he can toss once at the beginning of every stage. They showed that the player
can do better than using at every stage the outcome of the toss performed
at the beginning of that stage, and characterized the value of the game as a
function of the distribution of the coin. In their model, the player need not
use the information provided by the coin at the stage in which it is obtained,
but may rather use this information in subsequent stages. In our model, in
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contrast, aggregating the random information is impossible, since the letter
chosen by a faulty device may depend on past choices of the unfaulty device.
Though jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins reminds one of me-
diated talk (see, e.g., Lehrer (1996) and Lehrer and Sorin (1997)) and cheap
talk (see, e.g., Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Aumann and Hart (2003)), there
are some significant differences among the models. Indeed, while in medi-
ated talk and cheap talk the players are free to select the messages they
send out and the goal is to choose an action for each player, in our model,
when unfaulty, the devices choose messages according to a known stationary
probability distribution and the goal is to choose one outcome.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we discuss jointly controlled
lotteries with biased coins, and in Section 3 we apply the mechanism of jointly
controlled lotteries to general quitting games.
2 Jointly Controlled Lotteries with Biased Coins
To simplify the presentation we will assume that there are two random num-
ber generators; the extension to any number of random number generators
follows the same lines.
Let A1 and A2 be two finite sets, each containing at least two elements.
The set of finite histories1 is H := ∪∞t=0(A1 × A2)
t, and the set of infinite
histories is H∞ := (A1 × A2)∞. The set H∞ is a measurable space when
equipped with the product σ-algebra. For every t ≥ 0 denote by F t the
σ-algebra over H∞ defined by all histories of length t; it is the σ-algebra
spanned by the sets C(ht) := {h = (a1, a2, · · · ) ∈ H∞ : ht = (a1, · · · , at)} for
ht ∈ (A1 × A2)
t.
The basic concept that we need is that of a mechanism, which describes
how to generate an element from a set J given an infinite history.
Definition 2.1 A mechanism is a triplet M := (τ, J, f) where
• τ is a stopping time w.r.t. the filtration (F t)t≥0.
• J is a finite set.
• f : H∞ → J is a function that is measurable w.r.t. the σ-algebra F τ .
1By conventions, the set (A1 ×A2)
0 contains only the empty history.
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When M = (τ, J, f) is a mechanism, every probability distribution µ over
H∞ defines a probability distribution µM over J by
µM(j) = µ({h ∈ H
∞ : f(h) = j}).
Let i ∈ {1, 2}. A (behavior) strategy for the i’s coordinate is a function
σi : H → ∆(Ai) that assigns a distribution over Ai to each finite history.
The set of all strategies for the i’th coordinate is denoted Σi. A strategy
is stationary if σi(h
t) is independent of ht ∈ H . Every pair of strategies
(σ1, σ2) defines a probability measure Pσ1,σ2 over H
∞, and in particular,
together with a mechanism M it defines a probability measure Pσ1,σ2,M over
J .
We now present three properties of mechanisms: having finite length,
being able to implement a given probability distribution, and being able to
implement the distribution in a secure way.
Definition 2.2 Let T ∈ N. A mechanism M = (τ, J, f) has length at most
T if Pσ1,σ2(τ ≤ T ) = 1 for every pair of strategies (σ1, σ2).
Definition 2.3 Let ε ≥ 0 and let ν be a probability distribution over J .
The mechanism M = (τ, J, f) and the pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2
ε-implement the distribution ν if ‖Pσ1,σ2,M − ν‖∞ ≤ ε. The mechanism
M = (τ, J, f) and the pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 ε-implement the
distribution ν in a strong secure fashion if for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every
strategy σ′i ∈ Σi, the mechanism M and the pair of strategies (σ
′
i, σ3−i) ε-
implement the distribution ν.
Our first result concerns the possibility of ε-implementing any distribution
in a secure fashion given any pair of stationary strategies.
Theorem 2.4 Let A1, A2, and J be three finite sets, each of which contains
at least two elements. Let σ1 (resp. σ2) be a stationary strategy that selects
all elements in A1 (resp. A2) with positive probability, and let ν be any dis-
tribution on ν. For every ε > 0 there is a mechanism M = (τ, J, f) that has
a finite length and, together with the pair of stationary strategies (σ1, σ2),
ε-implements ν in a strong secure fashion.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g.2 that |A1| = |A2| = 2, and denote Ai = {α, β}
for i ∈ {1, 2}. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, the strategy σi is stationary; denote by
2If the set Ai contains more than two elements, divide it arbitrarily into two subsets,
and treat all elements that lie in the same subset as equivalent.
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σi(α) and σi(β) the per-stage probability that strategy σi selects the elements
α and β, respectively.
For every t ∈ N define a random variable Y t over H∞ as follows:
Y t :=

−σ1(β)σ2(β) a
t = (α, α),
σ1(β)σ2(α) a
t = (α, β),
σ1(α)σ2(β) a
t = (β, α),
−σ1(α)σ2(α) a
t = (β, β),
We observe that Eσ1,σ′2[Y
t] = Eσ′
1
,σ2 [Y
t] = 0, for every t ≥ 0 and every pair
of strategies (σ′1, σ
′
2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2.
For every real number C > 0 let τC be the stopping time
τC := min
{
t ∈ N :
t∑
k=1
(Y k)2 ≥ C
}
. (1)
Denoting by c0 := min{σ1(α), σ1(β), σ2(α), σ2(β)} > 0, we obtain that the
stopping time τC is bounded by
C
c2
0
. Denote ZC :=
∑τC
t=1
Y t√
C
. The Martin-
gale Central Limit Theorem (see, e.g., McLeish, 1974), implies that for each
player i and each strategy σ′i ∈ Σi of player i, under the pair of strategies
(σ′i, σ3−i) the distribution of ZC converges to the standard normal distribu-
tion as C goes to infinity. Moreover, the rate of convergence is independent
of σ′i.
It follows that to ε-implement ν in a strong secure fashion, we need to
divide the real line R into J disjoint intervals I1, I2, · · · , IJ , such that the
probability of the interval Ij under the standard normal distribution is ν(j),
for each j ∈ J . We then choose C sufficiently large, and define the mechanism
M by (τC , J, f), where for every infinite history h we define f(h) to be the
unique j ∈ J such that ZC(h) ∈ Ij .
We now weaken the security requirement of the mechanism. The weaker
condition does not require that the mechanism stops in finite time whatever
the players play, but rather that it stops in finite time when the two random
generator devices are not faulty, and that if one of the devices is faulty, then
its outputs will necessarily reveal that it is faulty.
Definition 2.5 Let ε ≥ 0 and let ν be a probability distribution over J .
The mechanism M = (τ, J, f) and the pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 ×
Σ2 ε-implement the distribution ν in a weak secure fashion if the following
conditions hold:
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(W.1) M and (σ1, σ2) ε-implement the distribution ν.
(W.2) For every strategy σ′1 ∈ Σ1 we have Pσ′1,σ2,M(j) ≤ ν(j).
(W.3) For every strategy σ′2 ∈ Σ2 we have Pσ1,σ′2,M(j) ≤ ν(j).
(W.4) There are two disjoint events D1 and D2 such that
– D1 ∪D2 ⊆ {τ =∞}.
– Pσ1,σ2(D1) = Pσ1,σ2(D2) = 0.
– For every strategy σ′1 ∈ Σ1 we have Pσ′1,σ2(D1) + Pσ′1,σ2({τ <
∞}) = 1.
– For every strategy σ′2 ∈ Σ2 we have Pσ1,σ′2(D2) + Pσ1,σ′2({τ <
∞}) = 1.
The event D1 and D2 in Definition 2.5 are used to reveal the identity of
the faulty device: on the event Di it is known that device i is faulty, for
i = 1, 2; indeed, this set occurs with probability 0 if no device is faulty, and
it occurs whenever the mechanism does not stop and device i is faulty. Note
that whereas strong security requires the stopping time τ to be uniformly
bounded, weak security has no such restriction.
Theorem 2.6 Let A1, A2, and J be three finite sets, each of which contains
at least two elements. Let σ1 (resp. σ2) be a stationary strategy that selects
all elements in A1 (resp. A2) with positive probability, and let ν be any dis-
tribution on ν. There is a mechanism M = (τ, J, f) that 0-implements ν in
a weak secure fashion.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that |A1| = |A2| = 2, and denote Ai = {α, β} for
i = 1, 2. Let (Y t)t∈N be a stochastic process with values in ∆(J), adapted
to the filtration (F t)t≥0, which satisfies the following properties:
(C.1) Y 0 = ν.
(C.2) Y t+1 depends deterministically on Y t, at+11 , and a
t+1
2 , and not on Y
0, · · · , Y t−1.
(C.3) Eσ1,α[Y
t+1 | Y t] = Eσ1,β[Y
t+1 | Y t] = Y t.
(C.4) Eα,σ2[Y
t+1 | Y t] = Eβ,σ2[Y
t+1 | Y t] = Y t.
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(C.5) If the support of Y t contains more than one element, then for every
possible value λ of the random variable Y t that is attained with positive
probability, at least one of the distributions (Y t+1 | Y t, α, α), (Y t+1 |
Y t, α, β), (Y t+1 | Y t, β, α), and (Y t+1 | Y t, β, β) has a support that
contains less elements than the support of λ.
To show that such a process exists, let λ be a possible value of Y t. Denote
by da1,a2 the distribution (Y
t+1 | Y t = λ, a1, a2), for each a1, a2 ∈ {α, β}.
Conditions (C.3) and (C.4) determine three equalities that the four variables
(da1,a2)a1,a2∈{α,β} should satisfy. One solution of these equalities is da1,a2 = λ
for every a1, a2 ∈ {α, β}. Since the number of conditions is smaller by one
than the number of variables, the set of solutions is a line, hence there is
a solution on the boundary of the set (∆(J))4, and therefore indeed such a
stochastic process (Y t)t≥0 exists.
Conditions (C.3) and (C.4) imply that the process (Y t)t∈N is a martin-
gale under (σ1, σ2), hence it converges Pσ1,σ2-a.s. to a random variable Y
∞.
Denote
c1 := min{σ1(α)σ2(α), σ1(α)σ2(β), σ1(β)σ2(α), σ1(β)σ2(β)} > 0.
Under the stationary strategy pair (σ1, σ2), for every t ∈ N, the probability
that the support of Y t+1 is strictly contained in the support of Y t is at
least c1. It follows that Y
∞ is a Dirac measure Pσ1,σ2-a.s. Since the process
(Y t)t∈N is a martingale, it follows that for every j ∈ J we have Pσ1,σ2(Y
∞ =
j) = Y 0(j) = ν(j). Setting τ = ∞ and M = (τ, J, Y ∞) we obtain that M
0-implements the distribution ν, and Condition (W.1) holds.
Condition (C.3) implies that the process (Y t)t≥0 is a martingale under
(σ1, σ
′
2) for every strategy σ
′
2 ∈ Σ2, which implies that Condition (W.3)
holds. Analogously, Condition (W.2) holds as well.
We complete the proof by proving that Condition (W.4) holds. Denote by
(ât1, â
t
2) ∈ A1 ×A2 an action pair such that the support of (Y
t+1 | Y t, ât1, â
t
2)
is strictly contained in the support of Y t. We note that under strategy σi we
have
Pσi,σ′3−i(a
t
i = â
t
i infinitely often) = 1, ∀σ
′
3−i ∈ Σ3−i.
For i ∈ {1, 2} define an event Di by
Di := {a
t
i = â
t
i finitely many times, a
t
3−i = â
t
3−i infinitely often}.
The eventDi contains all histories in which device 3−i chooses the action that
leads to a decrease in the support of Y t infinitely many times, while device i
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does not do so. The reader can verify that Condition (W.4) in Definition 2.5
holds, and therefore the mechanism M 0-implements the distribution ν in a
weak secure fashion.
3 Undiscounted ε-Equilibrium in General Quit-
ting Games
In this section we provide an application of jointly controlled lotteries with
biased coins to the area of stochastic games. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, whether every stochastic game admits an undiscounted equilibrium
payoff is one of the most challenging open problems in game theory to date.
We will use the tools developed in Section 2 to prove the existence of an
undiscounted ε-equilibrium in a class of stochastic games that was termed
general quitting game in Solan and Solan (2018). A general quitting game is
a vector Γ = (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) where
• I is a finite set of players.
• Aci is a finite nonempty set of continue actions, for each player i ∈ I.
The set of all actions of player i is Ai := A
c
i ∪ {Qi}, where Qi is
interpreted as a quitting action. The set of all action profiles is A =
×i∈IAi.
• u : A→ [0, 1]I is a payoff function.
The game proceeds as follows. At every stage t ∈ N, each player i ∈ I
chooses an action ati ∈ Ai. Let a
t = (ati)i∈I be the action profile chosen at
stage t. Denote by t∗ the first stage in which some player selects his quitting
action; that is, the first stage t such that ati = Qi for some player i ∈ I. The
stage payoff at stage t is given by u(amin{t,t∗}).
A (behavior) strategy of player i is a function σi : (∪
∞
t=0A
t) → ∆(Ai). A
strategy profile is a vector of strategies σ = (σi)i∈I , one for each player. Every
strategy profile σ induces a probability distribution over the set of plays A∞.
Denote by Eσ the corresponding expectation operator and by
γ(σ) := Eσ
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(amin{t,t∗})
]
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the expected (undiscounted) payoff under strategy profile σ. Note that the
way a strategy is defined after the termination stage t∗ does not affect the
payoff.
A mixed action profile x ∈ ×i∈I∆(Ai) is nonabsorbing if under x all
players play continue actions with probability 1, and it is absorbing otherwise.
Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈I is an ε-equilibrium3 if for every
player i ∈ I and every strategy σ′i of player i,
γi(σ) ≥ γi(σ
′
i, σ−i)− ε.
A sunspot ε-equilibrium is an ε-equilibrium in an extended game ΓE that
contains a correlation device, which sends a public signal st at the beginning
of each stage t ∈ N. Here, st is uniformly distributed in [0, 1] and independent
of s1, · · · , st−1 and of the past actions played by the players. In particular,
a (behavior) strategy for player i in the extended game ΓE is a function
ξi :
(
∪∞t=0 (×i∈I([0, 1]× Ai))
t
)
× [0, 1] → ∆(Ai). The payoff induced by a
strategy profile ξ = (ξi)i∈I is
γE(ξ) := Eξ
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(amin{t,t∗})
]
,
where Eξ is the expectation w.r.t. the probability distribution Pξ induced by
ξ over the space of infinite plays (×i∈I([0, 1]×Ai))
∞. The strategy profile ξ
is a sunspot ε-equilibrium in the game Γ if γEi (ξ) ≥ γ
E
i (ξ
′
i, ξ−i)− ε, for every
player i ∈ I and every strategy ξ′i of player i.
Solan and Solan (2018) proved that every generalized quitting game ad-
mits a sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. Our main result in this section
is that when at least two players have at least two continue actions, the game
admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Theorem 3.1 Let Γ = (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) be a general quitting game that satisfies
|Ac1| ≥ 2 and |A
c
2| ≥ 2. Then for every ε > 0 the game admits an ε-
equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we describe the structure of the sunspot ε-equilibrium
constructed in Solan and Solan (2018). In that paper, it was proven that for
3The concept that we define is that of undiscounted ε-equilibrium. Theorem 3.1 below
holds also for the stronger notion of uniform ε-equilibrium as well.
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every general quitting game Γ = (I, (Aci)i∈I , u) there exists a mixed action
profile x = (xi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I∆(Ai) such that (at least) one of the following two
alternatives hold for every ε > 0:
(A.1) The mixed action profile x is absorbing, and, when supplemented with
threat strategies, it defines a stationary ε-equilibrium.
(A.2) The mixed action profile x is nonabsorbing, and the game admits a
sunspot ε-equilibrium ξ in which at every stage t the players play the
mixed action profile x, except of possibly one player it, whose identity
is determined by the correlation device, who plays the mixed action
(1 − ηt)xit + η
tQit , where the random variable η
t has values in (0, ε)
and depends on the history before stage t and on it. Moreover, under
ξ the play terminates with probability 1.
Thus, if Alternative (A.2) holds, then the players play mainly the station-
ary strategy profile x, and take turns in stopping the game: in each stage t
the correlation device may designate one player it as the possible quitter,
and that player stops the game with a history-dependent probability ηt. If
the correlation device did not designate any player as the possible quitter,
then all players follow x. The order in which the players are selected by the
correlation device is random, it depends on the device’s past choices, and is
crafted so as to keep incentive constraints.
In both cases (A.1) and (A.2), statistical tests are conducted to ensure
that the players do not deviate from the prescribed strategy profile. In
Case (A.2) the players verify that the distribution of continue actions played
by each player i is close to xi. In Case (A.1), if under the strategy profile x
exactly one player, say, player i0, quits with positive probability, then, if the
play is not terminated after sufficiently many stages, player i0 is punished.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. To prove the result we need to consider
case (A.2) only. Fix then ε > 0 and let ξ be a sunspot ε-equilibrium in
the extended game ΓE in which the players play mainly some nonabsorbing
mixed action profile x. Assume first that both x1 and x2 are not pure.
The idea is to define a strategy profile σ in the game Γ by replacing the
correlation device with jointly controlled lotteries conducted by Players 1
and 2. That is, we will divided the play into blocks of random size; block t
will correspond to stage t of the implementation of ξ. All stages of the block
except the last one will be used to perform a jointly controlled lottery by
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Players 1 and 2, which will mimic the correlation device; that is, in this
lottery Players 1 and 2 will select a player it ∈ I according to a probability
distribution that is close to that indicated by ξ for stage t. In the last stage
of the block the players will play as ξ plays in stage t, given the outcome of
the jointly controlled lottery conducted in that block.
Formally, for each t ∈ N denote by kt the stage of the game in which
block t starts, by ât the action profile that the players play in the last stage
of block t (stage kt+1 − 1), and by it the player who is selected by Players 1
and 2 in block t using the jointly controlled lottery mechanism of Theorem 2.4
(which will be described shortly in the context of the general quitting game).
Let T ∈ N be sufficiently large such that
Pξ
(
T∏
t=1
(1− ηt) > ε
)
< ε : (2)
under ξ with probability at least 1 − ε, the play terminates before stage T
with high probability.
Let σ be the following strategy profile in the general quitting game Γ:
(B.1) In block t the players play as follows. Consider the situation of a
jointly controlled lottery performed by Players 1 and 2, where C =
ε
T 2
, J = I ∪ {0}, where 0 will mean that no player is designated to
quit, and the distribution ν is the probability distribution over the set
I ∪ {0} determined by the strategy profile ξ given the past history
(â1, · · · , ât−1, i1, · · · , it−1).
Under σ the players play the mixed action profile x until the game
terminates (if some player quits) or until stage τC of the block (stage
kt + τC − 1 of the game), where τC is the stopping time defined in
Eq. (1). Note that the length of this phase is uniformly bounded, even
if one player deviates from the play described herein.
(B.2) If the outcome of the jointly controlled lottery is 0, in the last stage of
the block the players play the mixed action profile x.
(B.3) Otherwise, denote by ît ∈ I the player who is selected according to
the mechanism described in Theorem 2.4. At the last stage of the
block, the players follow the strategy ξ at stage t, given the history
(â1, · · · , ât−1, î1, · · · , ît).
12
We thus defined a strategy profile σ in the general quitting game Γ.
By Eq. (2) and since the difference between the distribution of the jointly
controlled lottery at each block t and ξ(ht) is at most ε
T
, a standard coupling
argument shows that ‖γ(σ) − γE(ξ)‖∞ ≤ 2ε; that is, the expected payoff
under σ is 2ε-close to the expected payoff under ξ.
We argue that no player can profit more than 6ε by deviating to a pure
strategy. Fix then a player i ∈ I and a pure strategy σ′i of that player. Using
the strategy σ′i we will define a strategy ξ
′
i in the game with correlation
device and show that γi(σ
′
i, σ−i) ≤ γ
E
i (ξ
′
i, ξ−i) + 3ε. Since ξ is a sunspot
ε-equilibrium, it will follow that
γi(σ
′
i, σ−i) ≤ γ
E
i (ξ
′
i, ξ−i) + 3ε ≤ γ
E
i (ξ) + 4ε ≤ γi(σ) + 6ε,
as claimed.
Our goal now is to construct a strategy ξ′i in the game with correla-
tion device and prove that γi(σ
′
i, σ−i) ≤ γ
E
i (ξ
′
i, ξ−i) + 3ε. As described
above, the strategy profile (σ′i, σ−i) defines a partition of the stages N into
blocks.4 For each block t the play defines an element ît ∈ I ∪ {0} that
indicates if some player has to quit with low probability, and if so, his
identity, and an action profile ât ∈ A, which determines the action profile
played by any player who does not quit. Let ρt be the conditional prob-
ability that under (σ′i, σ−i) player i quits during the first τC − 1 stages of
block t, given î1, · · · , ît−1, â1, · · · , ât−1. For every action ai ∈ Ai, let µt(ai)
be the conditional probability that under (σ′i, σ−i) we have â
t
i = ai, given
î1, · · · , ît−1, ît, â1, · · · , ât−1. Let ξ′i be the strategy of player i, that plays as
follows at stage t:
• The quitting action Qi is played with probability ρt.
• For each ai ∈ Ai, the action ai is played with probability (1−ρt)µt(ai).
Since under ξ−i and σ−i the designated player quits with probability at most
ε, it follows that ‖γ(σ′i, σ−i)− γ
E(ξ′i, ξ−i)‖ ≤ 3ε, as claimed.
It is left to take care of the situation that one (or both) of the mixed
actions x1 or x2 is pure. If the mixed action x1 is pure, then, since |A
c
1| ≥ 2,
we can find a mixed action x′1 ∈ ∆(A
c
1) that is not pure and ε-close to x1
in the l∞-norm. A similar statement holds for x2. In Step (B.1) we then
4In fact, the partition is only of the stages up to the termination stage.
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change xi by x
′
i for each player i ∈ {1, 2} whose mixed action xi is pure.
The only effect that this change has is that if a player quits, then his payoff
changes by at most 2ε. Consequently the strategy profile described above is
a 10ε-equilibrium.
References
[1] Aumann R.J. and Hart S. (2003) Long Cheap Talk, Econometrica,
71(6), 1619–1660.
[2] Farrell J. and Rabin M. (1996) Cheap Talk, Journal of Economic per-
spectives, 10(3), 103–118.
[3] Flesch J., Thuijsman F. and O.J. Vrieze (1997) Cyclic Markov Equilib-
rium in Stochastic Games, International Journal of Game Theory, 26,
303–314.
[4] Gossner O. and Vieille N. (2002) How to Play with a Biased Coin,
Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 206–226.
[5] Lehrer E. (1996) Mediated talk, International Journal of Game Theory,
25, 177–188.
[6] Lehrer E. and Sorin S. (1997) One-shot public mediated talk, Games
and Economic Behavior, 20, 131–148.
[7] McLeish D.L. (1974) Dependent Central Limit Theorems and Invariance
Principles. Annals of Probability, 2(4), 620–628.
[8] Simon R.S. (2012) A Topological Approach to Quitting Games, Math-
ematics of Operations Research, 37, 180–195.
[9] Solan E. (1999) Three-Player Absorbing Games, Mathematics of Oper-
ations Research, 24, 669–698.
[10] Solan E. and Solan O.N. (2017) Quitting Games and Linear Comple-
mentarity Problems. Preprint.
[11] Solan E. and Solan O.N. (2018) Sunspot Equilibrium in Absorbing
Games. Preprint.
14
[12] Solan E. and Vieille N. (2001) Quitting Games, Mathematics of Oper-
ations Research, 26, 265–285.
[13] Vieille N. (2000a) Equilibrium in 2-Person Stochastic Games I: A Re-
duction, Israel Journal of Mathematics, 119, 55–91.
[14] Vieille N. (2000b) Equilibrium in 2-Person Stochastic Games II: The
Case of Recursive Games, Israel Journal of Mathematics, 119, 93–126.
15
